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Abstract
Diversity in the workplace implies a balance in positions held by different social groups
in organizations. We analyze the effect of negative stereotypes about the abilities of individ-
uals from disadvantaged backgrounds on efforts and outcomes in teams. A project’s success
depends on the abilities and efforts of agents from different backgrounds. Under simultane-
ous effort contribution, the stereotype lowers efforts of all agents and the project’s success
chance. When the principal assigns the disadvantaged/stereotyped agent as leader in effort
contribution, the effect of the stereotype is mitigated and the project’s success chance is the
highest; this also maximizes the principal’s expected payoff. Although the principal offers
symmetric incentives, the stereotyped agent often exerts higher effort.
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1 Introduction
Most organizations seek to accomplish diversity in the workplace by achieving a balance in
positions held by individuals from different social groups. However, often, there are negative
stereotypes about the abilities of individuals from disadvantaged groups – say, due to historical
reasons or because it might be considered that affirmative action makes it easier for candidates
from such social backgrounds to get a position. Coate and Loury (1993) show that, in a model
of statistical discrimination, negative stereotypes can persist due to affirmative action; see, also,
Hoff and Stiglitz (2010). See Jones (2002) for the psychological aspect of stereotyping. Further,
almost all Fortune 1000 companies use team projects, but 90% of teams result in failures (Shaw
and Schneier, 1995).1 Given the importance of diversity and team production in organizations,
we analyze the impact of stereotypes in such settings and how production can be structured to
reduce their impact.
Previous work has shown the positive impact of biased self-perception on performance.2
Gervais and Goldstein (2007) analyze the effect of having an overconfident team-member (who
believes her productivity is higher than it actually is) when there are peer effects (complemen-
tarities). Overconfidence can improve outcomes for the team and the principal as this agent
exerts higher effort than she would otherwise. In contrast, we focus on the impact of negative
stereotypes about other team-members’ abilities based on social backgrounds.3,4
In our model, two agents from different backgrounds, advantaged and disadvantaged, are
employed to work in a team. The project’s success depends on the agents’ efforts and abilities.
The advantaged agent believes a negative stereotype about the disadvantaged agent – that the
latter’s ability is lower than it is actually. Our results highlight the negative impact of such
stereotype in team settings with complementarity (peer effects). Under simultaneous effort con-
tribution, the advantaged agent exerts low effort because she underestimates the disadvantaged
agent’s effort (hence, the marginal productivity of her own effort). The stereotyped agent in-
ternalizes this bias which, in turn, reduces the marginal productivity of her effort (due to the
advantaged agent’s low effort) and also exerts low effort.
Making effort contribution sequential increases efforts relative to simultaneous efforts – with
the stereotyped agent as leader, efforts (and hence, the project’s success chance) are the highest.5
When the disadvantaged agent leads, the advantaged agent observes the former’s effort and
does not have to rely on her beliefs about this. Hence, the negative impact of the stereotype is
1The classic paper dealing with incentives in teams is Holmstro¨m (1982); see, also, Lazear and Shaw (2007).
2Compte and Postlewaite (2004) show that self-perception biases can be optimal when confidence influences
an individual’s performance.
3Chaudhuri and Sethi (2008) analyze the effect of stereotypes on human capital investment in a model of
statistical discrimination with peer effects. Empirical evidence on the negative impact of affirmative action
through peer effects in education have been provided in Kochar (2010) and Sekhri (2012).
4Although one might say that team-members may not be aware of each others social identity, in India,
for instance, surnames can help identify one’s religion/caste; see Banerjee, et al. (2009) and Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2004). Further, it is natural for individuals to have some information about the background of
co-workers in a team; in case of gender, color, etc., there is no effective way to hide these characteristics. Even
if background were not fully visible, one can form beliefs about a co-worker’s background.
5See Hermalin (1998) for a signaling model of leadership. Andreoni (2006) shows how ‘leadership giving’ can
increase charitable contribution when it provides a signal of the charity’s quality.
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mitigated, resulting in the highest expected payoff for the principal. It is always optimal for the
principal to offer agents symmetric incentives. As the stereotype becomes more pronounced,
the disadvantaged agent’s effort increases relative to the advantaged agent. This is because the
former (correctly) perceives a higher marginal productivity of her effort than the latter who
believes the stereotype.
These results are also related to the sequential contribution literature on public goods pro-
vision. Varian (1994) shows that, under complete information and substitutability, sequential
contribution worsens the free rider problem and total contribution is generally lower than that
under simultaneous contributions. One might expect the stereotype to further exacerbate the
usual free riding problem. However, in team settings with stereotypes and peer effects, the
outcomes are counter to Varian (1994).6
2 The Model
A risk-neutral principal employs two risk-neutral agents to work in a team for a joint project.
Agents belong to two different social backgrounds, i ∈ {A,B}; A and B denote advantaged and
disadvantaged groups, respectively. We denote both the group and agent by i ∈ {A,B}.
The probability of the project’s success is given by a standard Cobb-Douglas function:
P = P (ηA, ηB, eA, eB) = η
α
Ae
1−α
A η
α
Be
1−α
B , α ∈ (0, 1), (1)
where ηi and ei are the ability and effort of agent i, respectively, i ∈ {A,B}. Hence, there are
peer effects due to the complementarity of efforts of the agents.
If the project succeeds, it generates a payoff of V for the principal, who is unable to observe
efforts, so cannot condition agent payoffs directly on efforts but only on outcomes. Agent i is
paid vi when the project succeeds and zero otherwise. We normalize the agents’ outside option
to zero. The cost of effort is C(ei) =
1
2e
2
i . Hence, agent i’s utility is:
Ui =
vi − 12e2i , if the project succeeds,−12e2i , if the project fails.
The principal’s net payoff is:
W =
V − vA − vB, if the project succeeds,0, if the project fails.
Agents know their own ability, i.e., there is no self-perception bias. Their belief about the
other agent’s ability may not be accurate. Agent j’s perception/belief about i’s ability is η˜i,
i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j. Agent B’s belief about A’s ability is accurate, i.e., η˜A = ηA. However,
Assumption 1 (Stereotype). Agent A believes a negative stereotype about B: specifically, A
believes that B’s ability is lower than it actually is, i.e., η˜B = ηB − b < ηB, 0 < b < ηB.
6Bag and Roy (2011) show that, with incomplete information about private valuations for a public good,
sequential contributions can result in higher total contribution than under simultaneous contributions.
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We also assume that A knows that B believes η˜A = ηA and B knows that A believes
η˜B = ηB − b. The model is kept simple to focus on our key issue – the impact of stereotypes
about an agent’s ability (an unobservable characteristic) based on her social background (an
observable characteristic).7 Further, although the principal knows both agents’ abilities,8 she
cannot credibly communicate this to either agent.
3 Benchmark: Simultaneous Effort Contributions
When agents exert effort simultaneously, given {vA, vB}, the overall efforts are determined by
the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous-move unobservable effort contribution game.
Given {vA, vB}, agent A maximizes her expected utility
max
eA≥0
EUA = vA [ηαA (ηB − b)α e1−αA e1−αB ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
EA(P )
− 1
2
e2A,
where EA(P ) denotes A’s belief about the project’s success probability, which depends on her
beliefs about B’s ability (and effort). The stereotype implies that this belief is biased downward
since b > 0. The first-order condition gives A’s best-response function:9
eA = [(1− α) vA ηαA (ηB − b)α]
1
1+α eˆ
1−α
1+α
B ,
where eˆB is A’s belief about B’s effort choice.
Agent B’s problem is (given {vA, vB})
max
eB≥0
EUB = vB [ηαA ηαB e1−αA e
1−α
B ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
EB(P )
− 1
2
e2B,
where EB(P ) denotes B’s belief about the project’s success probability. The first-order condition
gives B’s best-response function (where eˆA denotes B’s belief about A’s effort choice):
eB = [(1− α) vB ηαA ηαB]
1
1+α eˆ
1−α
1+α
A .
Complementarity of efforts (peer effects) implies each agent’s effort is increasing in the other
agent’s effort: ∂eA∂eˆB > 0 and
∂eB
∂eˆA
> 0. Agent A underestimates B’s effort due to the stereotype,
i.e., eˆB = [(1− α)vBηαA(ηB − b)α]
1
1+α e
1−α
1+α
A .
Solving the best-response functions simultaneously, taking into account the stereotype, we
7Suppose, in contrast to our simplifying assumption, neither agent knows the other agent’s ability. Assume
that there are two ability types, η ∈ {ηh, η`}, ηh > η`; agent i’s subjective belief about j being of high ability,
ηh, is pˆj . If A assigns a low value to pˆB based on B’s social background, our main results would apply.
8See Bag, et al. (2015) for effects of biased employer beliefs on hiring decisions under job market signaling.
9Details of the derivation of efforts and verification of the second-order conditions for the agents’ and principal’s
problems are available as Supplementary Appendix.
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have the equilibrium efforts (with the superscript S denoting simultaneous efforts):
eSA = (1−α)
1
2α v
1+α
4α
A v
1−α
4α
B η
1
2
A (ηB−b)
1
2 , and eSB = (1−α)
1
2α v
1−α
4α
A v
1+α
4α
B η
1
2
A η
α
1+α
B (ηB−b)
1−α
2(1+α) .
(2)
It is straightforward to see that
∂eSi
∂b < 0, i ∈ {A,B}; hence, as b ↑, the effort of both agents
falls. As the stereotype lowers both agents’ efforts, it also lowers the project’s success chance.
The probability of the project’s success is (using (2)):
PS = ηαA η
α
B(e
S
A)
1−α(eSB)
1−α = (1− α) 1−αα ηA η
2α
1+α
B (ηB − b)
1−α
1+α︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ΓS
v
1−α
2α
A v
1−α
2α
B . (3)
The principal chooses {vA, vB} to maximize her net expected payoff, EW = (V − vA −
vB)P
S = (V − vA − vB)ΓSv
1−α
2α
A v
1−α
2α
B . The first-order conditions are:
∂EW
∂vi
= ΓSv
1−α
2α
i v
1−α
2α
j
[(
1− α
2α
)(
V − vi − vj
vi
)
− 1
]
= 0, i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j,
which together imply vA = vB = v (∵ ΓSv
1−α
2α
A v
1−α
2α
B 6= 0). Hence, the above conditions imply
v =
1− α
2
V, and W = αV.
This, in turn, implies (using (2)):
eSA
eSB
=
(
ηB − b
ηB
) α
1+α
< 1 ⇒ eSA < eSB.
We summarize the above results as follows:
Proposition 1 (Simultaneous Efforts). Under simultaneous effort contribution,
• The equilibrium effort levels are given by (2) and the stereotype about B’s ability lowers
both agents’ efforts compared to the situation in which there is no stereotype.
• The stereotype lowers the probability of the project’s success.
• As the stereotype becomes more pronounced, i.e., as b ↑, effort exerted by both agents
(hence, the project’s chance of success) falls.
• Despite the stereotype, it is optimal for the principal to offer symmetric incentives to
both agents: each is paid v = (1−α2 )V , and the principal retains W = αV , if the project
succeeds.
• The stereotyped agent exerts higher effort although both agents are paid symmetrically.
The stereotype lowers A’s expectation about B’s effort – this lowers A’s effort. B inter-
nalizes this and exerts low effort. Although both agents receive symmetric incentives, the
stereotyped agent exerts higher effort as her expectation about the marginal productivity of
her effort is not biased downward. Thus, the implicit return per unit of effort is lower for the
disadvantaged/stereotyped agent.
4
4 Sequential Effort Contribution
Consider how the principal can sequence effort contributions to mitigate the stereotype’s impact.
The timing is as follows. The principal offers {vA, vB}. Agent i exerts effort; after observing i’s
effort, j exerts effort, i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j. The project concludes and payments are made.
Advantaged Agent is the Leader. The principal assigns agent A as leader in effort
contribution. Given vA, vB and eA, the follower, B, solves
max
eB≥0
EUB = vBηαA ηαB e1−αA e
1−α
B −
1
2
e2B,
which gives the follower’s best-response function (the superscript F denotes the follower):
eFB = [(1− α) vB ηαA ηαB]
1
1+α e
1−α
1+α
A . (4)
The leader, A, incorporates the follower’s best response in her effort choice problem:
max
eA≥0
EUA = vA
[
ηαA(ηB − b)α e1−αA (eˆFB)1−α
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
EA(P )
−1
2
e2A = vAv
1−α
1+α
B (1−α)
1−α
1+α η
2α
1+α
A (ηB−b)
2α
1+α e
2(1−α)
1+α
A −
1
2
e2A.
Note that A underestimates not only the marginal productivity of B’s effort, but also the latter’s
effort due to the stereotype. When incorporating the follower’s effort into her optimization
problem, A uses eˆFB = [(1− α) vB ηαA (ηB − b)α]
1
1+α e
1−α
1+α
A rather than B’s actual effort, e
F
B,
given by (4). The optimal effort of the leader, A, is:
eLA =
(
2
1 + α
) 1+α
4α
(1− α) 12α v
1+α
4α
A v
1−α
4α
B η
1
2
A (ηB − b)
1
2 , (5)
where the superscript L denotes that A is the leader. Using (4) and (5), we have:
eFB =
(
2
1 + α
) 1−α
4α
(1− α) 12α v
1−α
4α
A v
1+α
4α
B η
1
2
A η
α
1+α
B (ηB − b)
1−α
2(1+α) . (6)
It is easy to see that
∂eLA
∂b < 0 and
∂eFB
∂b < 0, i.e., as b ↑, the effort of both agents decreases.
The probability of the project’s success is (using (5) and (6)):
PA = ηαA η
α
B(e
L
A)
1−α(eFB)
1−α =
(
2
1 + α
) 1−α
2α
(1− α) 1−αα ηA η
2α
1+α
B (ηB − b)
1−α
1+α︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ΓA
v
1−α
2α
A v
1−α
2α
B . (7)
The principal chooses {vA, vB} to maximize her net expected payoff, EW = (V − vA −
vB)P
A = (V − vA − vB)ΓAv
1−α
2α
A v
1−α
2α
B . The first-order conditions are:
∂EW
∂vi
= ΓAv
1−α
2α
i v
1−α
2α
j
[(
1− α
2α
)(
V − vi − vj
vi
)
− 1
]
= 0, i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j,
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which together imply (since ΓAv
1−α
2α
A v
1−α
2α
B 6= 0) vA = vB = v. Hence,
v =
1− α
2
V, and W = αV.
Thus, not only are the payments to agents symmetric across the leader and follower, they are
also the same as those in the simultaneous efforts benchmark. This implies (using (5) and (6)):
eLA
eFB
=
(
2
1 + α
) 1
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
(
ηB − b
ηB
) α
1+α
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
.
Hence, if the stereotype is sufficiently strong (b high), even as leader, A exerts lower effort.
Comparing (2), (5) and (6) we get (since the vi’s, i ∈ {A,B}, are the same in the two cases):
eLA
eSA
=
(
2
1 + α
) 1+α
4α
> 1, and
eFB
eSB
=
(
2
1 + α
) 1−α
4α
> 1,
i.e., both agents exert higher effort with A as leader than under simultaneous moves; hence,
PA > PS . Even with a strong stereotype (high b), assigning A as leader improves the chances
of the project’s success. The principal’s expected payoff is, thus, higher with A as leader since
the payments in case of success are the same.
We summarize the above results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Advantaged Agent as Leader). Suppose the principal assigns agent A, who
believes the negative stereotype about B’s ability, as the leader in effort contribution. Then,
• The efforts of the leader (A) and follower (B) are given by (5) and (6), respectively; both
agents exert higher effort relative to simultaneous effort contributions.
• The project’s success chance is always higher when A is the leader as compared to the
simultaneous effort contribution game.
• As the stereotype about B becomes stronger, i.e., as b ↑, the effort of both agents falls.
• Despite the stereotype and sequential efforts, the principal offers symmetric incentives to
both leader and follower, v = (1−α2 )V , and retains W = αV , when the project succeeds –
the same as that under simultaneous efforts.
• The principal is better off under A’s leadership than under simultaneous efforts.
• If the stereotype is sufficiently strong, the leader A’s effort is lower than the follower B’s.
The leader exerts higher effort as she internalizes the effect of her effort choice on the
follower’s effort decision. The stereotype about the follower’s ability (hence, effort choice)
lowers A’s effort; this also reduces the follower’s effort. However, the first effect dominates and
both agents exert higher effort relative to simultaneous effort contributions. Despite being paid
symmetrically, agents exert differential efforts due to the stereotype and sequential moves.
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Disadvantaged/Stereotyped Agent is the Leader. Agent B is assigned the leader in
effort contribution. Given vA, vB and eB, A’s (the follower’s) problem is
max
eA≥0
EUA = vA [ηαA (ηB − b)α e1−αA e1−αB ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
EA(P )
− 1
2
e2A,
Note that, that even after observing B’s effort, A underestimates the chances of the project’s
success due to the stereotype. However, in contrast to earlier cases, A does not underestimate
B’s effort, which she observes before choosing eA. The follower’s effort is determined by her
best-response function (the superscript F denotes that A is the follower):
eFA = [(1− α) vA ηαA (ηB − b)α]
1
1+α e
1−α
1+α
B . (8)
B, as leader, incorporates (8) in her effort choice problem:
max
eB≥0
EUB = vB [ηαA ηαB(eˆFA)1−αe1−αB ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
EB(P )
−1
2
e2B = vBv
1−α
1+α
A (1−α)
1−α
1+α η
2α
1+α
A η
α
B(ηB−b)
α(1−α)
1+α e
2(1−α)
1+α
B −
1
2
e2B,
and her optimal effort is:
eLB =
(
2
1 + α
) 1+α
4α
(1− α) 12α v
1−α
4α
A v
1+α
4α
B η
1
2
A η
1+α
4
B (ηB − b)
1−α
4 , (9)
where the superscript L denotes that B is the leader. Further, using (8) and (9), we have:
eFA =
(
2
1 + α
) 1−α
4α
(1− α) 12α v
1+α
4α
A v
1−α
4α
B η
1
2
A η
1−α
4
B (ηB − b)
1+α
4 . (10)
It is easy to see that
∂eLB
∂b < 0 and
∂eFA
∂b < 0, i.e., as b ↑, the effort of both agents decreases.
The probability of the project’s success is (using (9) and (10)):
PB = ηαA η
α
B(e
F
A)
1−α(eLB)
1−α =
(
2
1 + α
) 1−α
2α
(1− α) 1−αα ηA η
1+α
2
B (ηB − b)
1−α
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ΓB
v
1−α
2α
A v
1−α
2α
B . (11)
The principal chooses {vA, vB} to maximize her net expected payoff, EW = (V − vA −
vB)P
B = (V − vA − vB)ΓBv
1−α
2α
A v
1−α
2α
B . The first-order conditions are:
∂EW
∂vi
= ΓBv
1−α
2α
i v
1−α
2α
j
[(
1− α
2α
)(
V − vi − vj
vi
)
− 1
]
= 0, i, j ∈ {A,B}, i 6= j,
which together imply vA = vB = v (since Γ
Bv
1−α
2α
A v
1−α
2α
B 6= 0). Hence,
v =
1− α
2
V, and W = αV.
Again, the payments to agents are symmetric, and the same as those under simultaneous efforts.
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This, along with (9) and (10), implies:
eFA
eLB
=
(
1 + α
2
) 1
2
(
ηB − b
ηB
)α
2
< 1.
The stereotyped agent, as leader, always exerts higher effort than the follower. As the stereotype
against B’s ability becomes stronger, her relative effort increases. Hence, the implicit return
per unit of effort is lower for the stereotyped agent.
Comparing (2), (9) and(10) we get (since the vi’s, i ∈ {A,B}, are the same in the two cases):
eFA
eSA
=
(
2
1 + α
) 1−α
4α
(
ηB
ηB − b
) 1−α
4
> 1, and
eLB
eSB
=
(
2
1 + α
) 1+α
4α
(
ηB
ηB − b
) (1−α)2
4(1+α)
> 1.
Hence, both agents always exert higher effort when the stereotyped agent leads as compared to
simultaneous effort contribution. Thus, PB > PS . As the stereotype becomes stronger (b ↑),
efforts under B’s leadership increase relative to simultaneous moves.
We summarize the above results in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Disadvantaged/Stereotyped Agent as Leader). Suppose the principal
assigns the stereotyped agent, B, as leader in effort contribution. Then,
• The efforts of the leader (B) and follower (A) are given by (9) and (10), respectively; both
agents exert higher effort relative to simultaneous effort contributions.
• The project’s success chance is always higher with the stereotyped agent, B, as leader as
compared to simultaneous effort contributions.
• As the stereotype about B becomes stronger, i.e., as b ↑, the effort of both agents falls.
• Despite the stereotype and sequential effort contributions, the principal offers symmetric
incentives to both agents, v = (1−α2 )V , and retains W = αV , when the project succeeds –
the same as that under simultaneous efforts and with A as leader.
• The principal is better off under B’s leadership than under simultaneous efforts.
• The disadvantaged agent, B, always exerts higher effort than the advantaged agent, A.
Agent B, as leader, exerts high effort since she internalizes the impact of her choice on the
follower’s effort and, unlike A, she does not believe the negative stereotype. This mitigates A’s
low expectation about B’s effort as A no longer has to rely on her (biased) belief about B’s effort.
This improved expectation about the project’s success increases the marginal productivity of
A’s effort and prompts A to contribute higher effort. Hence, having B (who is stereotyped) as
leader in effort contribution always improves both agents’ efforts. The stereotype and order of
moves imply that the return per unit of effort is lower for the disadvantaged agent relative to
the advantaged agent.
Which Sequential Contribution Regime is Better? Propositions 2 and 3 show that
with either A or B as leader, both agents exert higher effort relative to simultaneous effort
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contribution. Consider the project’s success probability under the two regimes, (7) and (11):
PB
PA
=
(
ηB
ηB − b
) (1−α)2
2(1+α)
> 1. (12)
This, combined with the earlier result that PA > PS , implies PB > PA > PS . Since the
principal’s share is the same under all regimes, the principal’s expected payoff is the highest
with B as leader and the lowest under simultaneous efforts. Furthermore, (12) implies that, as
the stereotype becomes stronger, the gain from B’s leadership increases. If there is no stereotype
(b = 0), both leadership regimes result in the same outcome.
We summarize the above results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (Comparison of Sequential Effort Contribution Outcomes). Comparing
the leadership regimes, we have:
• The chance of the project’s success and the principal’s expected surplus are highest with the
stereotyped agent, B, as leader and the lowest when effort contribution is simultaneous.
• As the stereotype becomes stronger (b ↑), the gain from B’s leadership relative to A’s
leadership increases.
The leader always internalizes the effect of her effort contribution on the follower’s effort
choice. However, if the stereotype is extreme (b is high), placing A as leader does not increase
her effort as much since she believes that B’s marginal productivity of effort is much lower than
it actually is and underestimates B’s effort. This problem is mitigated if the stereotyped agent
is assigned leader in effort contribution; B’s high effort increases the marginal productivity of
A’s effort (despite the stereotype), so she also exerts higher effort.
5 Discussion
We use a simple model to focus our analysis on the effect of background-based stereotypes
on efforts in a team setting with peer effects. Placing stereotyped agents as leaders in effort
contribution mitigates the effect of stereotypes and increases the chances of the project’s success.
Although both agents are offered symmetric incentives, which may seem non-discriminatory,
the disadvantaged/stereotyped agent exerts higher effort under the principal’s regime of choice.
Thus, the disadvantaged agent bears the cost of the stereotype through a lower implicit return
per unit of effort. Our analysis would be applicable to relatively short time frames compared
to the time it takes to change negative stereotypes. Future work could incorporate the change
in stereotypes over time as individuals from different social backgrounds interact repeatedly.
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